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 China, the WTO, and the Doha Agenda 
 
 
China’s accession to the WTO involved a dramatic liberalization of trade, and the 
development and strengthening of trade-related institutions. These reforms were 
estimated to result in a substantial expansion in China’s trade and in welfare 
improvements in China and the countries that trade extensively with China 
(Ianchovichina and Martin 2004). Since accession, China’s trade growth has been 
dramatic. Exports grew more than 100 percent in the three following years, and China is 
now the world’s third largest trader. 
 
Earlier analyses of the potential for multilateral reform have typically identified China as 
a major gainer from multilateral reform. These substantial gains were a consequence of 
China’s high initial levels of protection, which allowed for substantial efficiency gains 
from reductions in own-protection; and of the relatively high barriers facing China in 
some key product areas, particularly in agriculture. Studies which do not account for the 
reductions in China’s protection following accession (eg Polaski 2005) still typically find 
China to be the largest gainer from global trade reform. However, recent World Bank 
analysis (Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 2006) finds China’s potential gains 
to be relatively modest. Still, as Zhai (2006) has pointed out, these gains are larger than 
anything potentially available from participation in Asian regional arrangements because 
only multilateral reforms can hope to liberalize barriers against China’s largest export 
flows to industrial-country markets such as the United States and the European Union. 
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The purpose of this paper is to attempt to better understand the reasons for the dramatic 
reduction in the estimated potential gains to China from participation in global trade 
reform, and to consider the implications and some trade-policy options for China in the 
post-accession situation. To do this, we first examine the reforms associated with China’s 
accession to the WTO. Then, we consider the implications for China of potential future 
trade reforms beginning from the situation where all of China’s WTO accession 
commitments have been phased in. 
 
China’s WTO Accession Commitments 
 
Prior to accession to the WTO, China had one of the highest rates of protection in the 
world. As is shown in Table 1, tariffs averaged over 40 percent in 1992 and were 
complemented by a formidable array of non-tariff measures, including quotas, licenses 
and state trading.  
Table 1. China’s Average Statutory Tariff Rates on Merchandise Trade (percent) 
 
  All products  Primary products  Manufactures 
Year  Simple  Weighted Simple Weighted Simple Weighted 
1992  42.9 40.6 36.2 22.3 44.9  46.5
1993  39.9 38.4 33.3 20.9 41.8  44.0
1994  36.3 35.5 32.1 19.6 37.6  40.6
1996  23.6 22.6 25.4 20.0 23.1  23.2
1997  17.6 18.2 17.9 20.0 17.5  17.8
1998  17.5 18.7 17.9 20.0 17.4  18.5
1999  17.2 14.2 21.8 21.8 16.8  13.4
2000  17.0 14.1 22.4 19.5 16.6  13.3
2001  16.6 12.0 21.6 17.7 16.2  13.0
After 
accession  9.8 6.8 13.2 3.6 9.5  6.9
Source:  Ianchovichina and Martin (2004) 
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China’s accession commitments involved substantial reductions in tariffs in virtually all 
areas, as is shown in Table 2, as well as reductions in non-tariff barriers to trade. Table 2 
compares the estimated levels of protection post-accession with the levels prevailing in 
2001, the year of accession, and with 1995. The comparison with 1995 is important 
because this was the year in which the establishment of the WTO eliminated the 
possibility of China entering the multilateral trading system by resuming her status as a 
GATT Contracting Party. From that time it was clear that China would need to make 
substantial reductions in protection in order to secure membership in the WTO, and 
China began to do so. Because the late-1990’s reductions in protection were clearly 
motivated in part by a desire to establish China’s bona fides as a candidate member of the 
WTO, it seems reasonable to attribute much of this reduction in tariffs to WTO accession. 
 
The estimates of protection to agriculture in Table 2 are based on the work of Huang, 
Rozelle and Min (2004). Since agricultural protection prior to WTO accession was 
largely provided through non-tariff measures, they sought first to identify policy 
distortions, and then to evaluate the extent of these distortions through careful 




Table 2. Changes in China’s Protection Associated with WTO Accession 
Product 1995  2001  Post-accession 
Agriculture  % %  % 
Rice  –5.0 –3.3  –3.3 
Wheat  25.0 12.0  12.0 
Feedgrains  20.0 32.0  32.0 
Vegetables and fruits  –10.0 –4.0  –4.0 
Oilseeds  30.0 20.0  3.0 
Sugar  44.0 40.0  20.0 
Plant-based fibers  20.0 17.0  20.0 
Livestock and meat  –20.0 –15.0  –15.0 
Dairy  30.0 30.0  11.0 
Processed food  20.1 26.2  9.9 
Beverages and tobacco  137.2 43.2  15.6 
 Total  4.8 7.6  3.6 
Manufacturing      
Extractive industries  3.4 1.0  0.6 
Textiles  56.0 21.6  8.9 
Apparel  76.1 23.7  14.9 
Light manufactures  32.3 12.3  8.4 
Petrochemicals  20.2 12.8  7.1 
Metals  17.4 8.9  5.7 
Automobiles  123.1 28.9  13.8 
Electronics  24.4 10.3  2.3 
Other manufactures  22.0 12.9  6.6 
 Total  25.3 13.5  6.9 
Total merchandise trade  24.3 13.3  6.8 
Services      
Trade and transport  1.9 1.9  0.9 
Construction  13.7 13.7  6.8 
Communications  9.2 9.2  4.6 
Commercial services  29.4 29.4  14.7 
Other services  24.5 24.5  12.7 
Total Services  10.3 10.3  5.2 
Source: Ianchovichina and Martin (2004). 
 
To assess the likely level of protection after accession, the 2001 estimated rates of 
protection were compared with the post-accession commitments. Where needed, as in the 
cases of dairy products, cotton and sugar, these rates of protection were reduced in line 
with tariff binding commitments. Where protection rates were initially negative, as in the  
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case of rice, it was assumed that no change in protection rates would be required by WTO 
commitments. Where Tariff-Rate-Quotas (TRQs) were introduced and protection was 
initially positive, an assessment was made of the probability that the quotas would fill 
and the higher out-of-quota tariffs (65 percent in these cases, as against 1 percent in-
quota) be triggered. The fact that protection to plant-based-fibers (cotton) and to maize 
was initially provided by an export subsidy was taken as an indication of a relatively 
strong willingness to provide protection and it was therefore assumed that the right to 
impose the higher out-of-quota tariffs would be exercised when this is permitted. 
 
The analysis of liberalization in the Ianchovichina and Martin (2004) study found very 
large global gains ($75billion/per year) from China’s accession, with these gains shared 
almost equally between China and the rest of the world. However, most of the gains to 
China ($31billion of $41 billion) were the result of the liberalization undertaken in the 
period from 1995 to 2001. Only $9 billion in gains arose from the liberalization during 
the period from 2001 to 2007, consistent with the pattern that an initial halving of tariffs 
would generate roughly three times the gain from a subsequent halving of protection.  
 
An important feature of China’s accession commitments on merchandise trade was that 
all tariffs were bound, and bound at levels that required reductions in the previously-
applied rates. This makes China quite different from many other developing countries 
both in having complete binding of non-agricultural products, and in having essentially 
no binding overhang in its agricultural tariffs. As noted by Jean, Laborde and Martin  
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(2006), bound agricultural tariffs in developing countries are, on average, more than 




Since China’s accession commitments must be implemented regardless of the outcome of 
the Doha Agenda negotiations, it is clearly important that assessments of the implications 
of Doha agenda negotiations should begin from China’s trade regime with 
implementation of these accession commitments. To undertake this analysis, we 
compared all applied tariffs in 2001 with the commitments on tariff bindings made by 
China and reduced all applied rates to the extent needed to meet these commitments. This 
provided the baseline from which we considered potential liberalization under the Doha 
Agenda. We first considered a hypothetical benchmark of complete liberalization, and 
then compared this with scenarios more in the spirit of the declaration emerging from the 
Hong Kong Ministerial meeting of the WTO in late 2005. 
 
The Full Liberalization Benchmark 
While the full liberalization scenario is not expected in the immediate future, as a policy 
experiment it provides a very useful point of comparison with other scenarios. The full 
liberalization scenario was undertaken using the World Bank’s LINKAGE model (van 
der Mensbrugghe 2005). This model is a relatively standard global general equilibrium 
model that has been widely used for projections and for analysis of global trade 
liberalization. For this analysis it was run in a relatively standard form, with constant  
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returns to scale in production, fixed aggregate employment, and with tariff revenues 
returned costlessly to consumers. The model uses the Armington assumption to deal with 
the evident distinctions between goods from different countries that frequently manifest 
themselves through two-way trade in the same, finely-defined commodity. This modeling 
approach does imply that the set of commodities that countries produce remains the same, 
and that increasing supplies of exports generally require reductions in prices to clear the 
market.
1 The estimated effects of this reform for welfare are presented for a wide range of 
countries, including China, in Table 3. 
 
For China, a striking feature of this table is the relatively small size of the welfare gains 
from complete trade liberalization. While they are substantial in absolute terms, at $5.6 
billion, they are only 0.2 percent of GDP, only twice as high as for the United States, and 
one-eighth of the comparable ratio for developing countries as a group. China’s gains as a 
share of GDP are an order of magnitude lower than those for the composite of the 
Republic of Korea and Taiwan (China), which continue to have highly distorted 
agricultural sectors. They are lower than India’s gains, presumably because India has 
substantially larger efficiency gains from liberalization of its still-higher protection.  
 
As is evident from the Table 3, about three-quarters of the gains to China arise from 
reform of non-agricultural trade policies, with the residual one-quarter from agricultural 
trade policies. This contrasts with most other countries, where the gains are typically 
larger from agricultural trade reform than from non-agricultural. The relative importance 
                                                 
1 Hummels and Klenow (2005) question this assumption and show that about two-thirds of the 
increase in exports from growing economies generally results from expansion in the range of goods 
produced, and that the prices of the goods initially produced actually rises with income and export growth.  
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of gains from agricultural trade reform is particularly high in two groups of countries—
the net agricultural exporters such as Brazil, and the countries, such as Japan and the 
Republic of Korea, with large potential gains from reducing their own agricultural 
distortions. China fits neither category, and stands to make larger gains from a 
combination of terms-of-trade gains and efficiency gains from liberalization of non-
agricultural trade. 
 
A key proximate cause of the relatively small measured gains to China is the income 
losses resulting from terms of trade losses when China and the rest of the world lose. 
These losses, at $8.3 billion, exceed China’s net gain of $5.6 billion. In part, these losses 
reflect the large size of China in many markets for both its exports and imports. They also 
reflect the relatively concentrated nature of China’s export bundle, although this bundle 
has been diversifying extremely rapidly in recent years.   
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Table 3 Impacts on Real Income from Full Liberalization of Global Merchandise 
Trade, by Country or Region, 2015  
   Total 












That due to 
liberalization 
of all other 
merchandise 
   ($billion)  ($billion)  (percent)  (percent)  (percent) 
              
Australia and New Zealand  6.1  3.5  1.04  1.00  0.04 
EU 25 plus EFTA  65.2  0.5  0.65  0.38  0.26 
United States  16.2  10.7  0.11  0.05  0.07 
Canada  3.8  -0.3  0.41  0.63  -0.22 
Japan  54.6  7.5  1.10  0.72  0.37 
Korea and Taiwan  44.6  0.4  3.52  2.62  0.90 
Hong Kong and Singapore  11.2  7.9  2.60  0.46  2.13 
Argentina  4.9  1.2 1.15 0.96 0.19 
Bangladesh 0.1  -1.1  0.19  0.21  -0.03 
Brazil  9.9  4.6 1.52 1.51 0.02 
China  5.6  -8.3 0.21 0.05 0.15 
India 3.4  -9.4  0.37  -0.25  0.62 
Indonesia  1.9  0.2 0.71 0.31 0.41 
Thailand  7.7  0.7 3.91 2.09 1.82 
Vietnam  3.0  -0.2 5.25 2.49 2.76 
Russia  2.7  -2.7 0.54 0.23 0.31 
Mexico  3.6  -3.6 0.41 0.22 0.20 
South  Africa  1.3  0.0 0.87 0.35 0.52 
Turkey  3.3  0.2 1.32 0.81 0.51 
High-income  countries  201.6  30.3 0.62 0.40 0.23 
Developing  countries  85.7  -29.7 0.83 0.52 0.31 
Middle-income  countries  69.5  -16.7 0.84 0.56 0.28 
Low-income  countries  16.2  -12.9 0.81 0.38 0.43 
East Asia and Pacific  23.5  -8.5  0.69  0.37  0.32 
South Asia  4.5  -11.2  0.38  -0.14  0.52 
Europe and Central Asia  7.0  -4.0  0.67  0.51  0.16 
Middle East and North Africa  14.0  -6.4  1.16  0.27  0.89 
Sub Saharan Africa  4.8  -1.8  1.09  0.85  0.24 
Latin America & the Caribbean  28.7  2.2  1.02  0.94  0.08 
World total  287.3  0.6  0.67  0.43  0.25 
Note: Data are given relative to the baseline. Source: Anderson, Martin and van der 
Mensbrugghe (2006). 
 
The tariff dataset used in this analysis was based on the GTAP 6.1 database 
(www.gtap.org), which includes the effects of tariff preferences on the market access 
opportunities available to developing countries. This database was then adjusted to take 
into account a number of pre-existing commitments, including China’s WTO accession  
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commitments, the conclusion of developing countries’ Uruguay Round commitments in 
agriculture, and the accession of 10 new members to the European Union in 2004. One 
key question is which of these adjustments had the greatest effect on the measured 
welfare gains to China. Figure 1 shows the gains that would have accrued to China if 
only MFN tariffs were applied; when tariff preferences are added; and when China’s 
WTO commitments are factored in. From the Figure, it is clear that China’s measured 
gains from trade reform fall dramatically when the protection database includes 
preferences and the effects of WTO accession. It is also clear that the effects of WTO 
accession are much more important than the effects of preferences in bringing about this 
outcome. While the gains to other countries and regions also fall in this comparison—
partly because of the fall in China’s protection—they generally fall by much less than the 
gains from future reforms in China.  
Figure 1. Effects of preferences and trade reform commitments on gains from global 
trade reform, % of GDP. 
 
 
The full global liberalization benchmark was also used to evaluate the relative importance 
of liberalization in agricultural and non-agricultural trade, to provide some indication of  
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the relative priority that might be given to the negotiations under Agriculture and the 
Non-Agricultural Market access negotiations. Because of the importance of textiles and 
clothing to developing countries, and the high rates of protection on these commodities, 
we further decompose the non-agricultural liberalization into textiles and clothing and 
other categories.  
 
Our results decomposed by sector are provided in Table 4. They suggest that global 
liberalization of agriculture and food yields 63 percent of the total global gains, a result 
very similar to that obtained by Hertel and Keeney (2006) using a different model. This 
finding is consistent with the high tariffs in agriculture and food versus other sectors, but 
it is nonetheless remarkable given the low shares of agriculture and food in global GDP 
and global merchandise trade (less than 9 percent). The elimination of trade-distorting 
farm policies in high-income countries accounts for three-fourths of those gains. Notice 
too that as much of the gain to developing countries from farm reform results from 
South-South agricultural liberalization as from developing countries’ unrestricted access 
to markets in high-income countries. That is almost equally true in manufacturing in 
aggregate, despite the big gains from textiles and clothing reform ($13 billion from 
market access in high-income countries compared with $9 billion attributable to South-
South textiles trade growth). In other words, reform by developing countries is as 
important for economic welfare gains to the South as reform by high-income countries. It 
is clear that reforming agricultural policies in both sets of countries is crucial for 
developing countries, with reform by high-income countries in textiles only half as 
important as is their agricultural reform.   
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Table 4: Regional and sectoral source of gains from full liberalization of global 
merchandise trade, developing and high-income countries, 2015, (relative to the 
baseline scenario) 
 
  Gains by region in $billion  Percent of regional gain 










        
Developing countries liberalize:        
Agriculture and food  28 19 47 33  9 17 
Textiles and clothing  9 14 23 10  7  8 
Other merchandise  6 52 58  7 26 20 
All sectors  43 85  128 50 42 45 
        
High-income countries liberalize:        
Agriculture and food  26 109 135  30  54  47 
Textiles and clothing  13 2  15  15 1 5 
Other merchandise  4 5 9 5 3 3 
All sectors  43 116 159  50  58  55 
        
All countries liberalize:        
Agriculture and food  54 128 182  63  63  63 
Textiles and clothing  22 16 38 25  8 14 
Other merchandise  10 57 67 12 29 23 
All sectors  86 201 287 100 100 100 
 
Doha Scenarios 
Because the negotiations on agriculture and NAMA are undertaken separately, using 
different approaches (“modalities”), we examined them separately in our analysis of the 
Doha scenarios. Since it appears that the largest global gains would arise from 
agricultural trade reforms, and because of the Byzantine complexity of the agricultural 
trade negotiations, the specifications used in the agricultural negotiations are 
considerably more complex and this complexity has been reflected by specifying 
agricultural reforms using a “tiered” formula approach where higher tariffs are subject to 
larger cuts. This focus also appeared to be appropriate for China, which faces the highest 
agricultural trade barriers of any major trading country (Martin 2001).  
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Two scenarios were considered for agricultural and food products in isolation from 
nonagricultural tariff cuts, before incorporating cuts in nonagricultural market access 
barriers. The four simulations presented allow us to examine the efficacy of the tariff-
cutting rules in the absence of exceptions; on the vulnerability of tariff-cutting rules to 
exceptions, and on different levels of developing-country participation in the reforms (for 
a summary list of the simulations used, please see Table 5). The tiered formula uses 
progressively increasing marginal rates of cut up to 75 percent for the highest tariff 
bindings in industrial countries.
2 Tariff cuts in developing countries are generally two-
thirds the size of the cuts in industrial countries. Throughout this section, the WTO usage 
of the term developing countries applies when allocating special and differential 
treatment in the form of lesser commitments to reform. As a result, Hong Kong (China), 
Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan (China) are all subjected to the same tariff cuts as other 
developing economies despite their high incomes. 
 
                                                 
2 Marginal tariff cuts are used in the same spirit as a progressive income tax, to avoid the 
potentially problematic discontinuities associated with increasing proportional cuts.  
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Table 5 Summary of Doha Partial Liberalization Scenarios  
 
  
Baseline  Amends 2001 protection measures by allowing EU eastward enlargement to 
25 members, implementation of WTO accession commitments by China, 
and implementation of Uruguay Round commitments including abolition of 
quotas on textiles and clothing by the end of 2004, followed by normal 
global growth projection for ten more years to 2015 (baseline simulation) 
Scenarios A-D  All assume cuts in agricultural domestic support in four developed country 
markets and abolition of agricultural export subsidies in all countries, plus:  
Scenario A  “Tiered” formula for agricultural market access with smaller tariff cuts for 
developing countries and none for least developed countries 
Scenario B  Scenario A plus exceptions for sensitive products (2 percent of agricultural 
tariff lines for developed countries and 4 percent for developing countries) 
tariff bindings on these products are cut by 15 percent 
Scenario C  Scenario A plus 50 percent cut in all tariffs on nonagricultural products for 
developed countries, 33 percent for developing countries, and none for least 
developed countries 
Scenario D  Developed countries’ harmonizing formula cuts for agriculture, plus 
developed countries’ 50 percent cut in all nonagricultural tariffs, are also 
each applied in developing and least developed countries  
Source: Authors’ assumptions (see text). 
 
Because of the complexity of the tiered-formula cuts used in the agricultural negotiations, 
and their vulnerability to seemingly-minor deviations such as allowing a small percentage 
of tariff lines to be treated more leniently, it is useful to examine the consequences of 
these formulas for agricultural tariffs in, and facing, China and some comparator 
countries. Table 6 shows the implications of scenarios A to D for the tariffs imposed by 
these countries, while Table 7 shows the consequences for the tariffs facing exporters 
from each country. 
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  %  % Point Cut  % Point Cut 
China 10.0  2.3 0.9 
Japan 34.5  16.6  2.1 
Korea 90.1  44.5  12.2 
India 54.5  4.4  1.7 
USA 2.7  0.9  0.1 
Mercosur 12.8  0.4  0.0 
ASEAN 10.9  0.9  0.3 
SACU 12.6  0.7  0.2 
EU 11.8  6.1  1.3 
      
Industrial 14.1  6.6  0.9 
Developing 17.9  4.3  1.3 
  WORLD  15.8  5.5  1.1 
Source: Jean, Laborde and Martin (2006) 
 
Three results are striking in Table 6. The first is that the cuts that would be required in 
applied tariffs are quite large in countries like Japan and the Republic of Korea where 
tariff bindings, and applied rates, are particularly high. The second is that the cuts in 
applied rates in most countries are much smaller, frequently because the lower in-quota 
tariffs appear to be determining imports in many countries, and the WTO tariff cuts are 
focused on the out-of-quota tariff bindings. A third key finding  is that the inclusion of 
sensitive products with only a 15 percent cut in bindings leads to a dramatic reduction in 
the tariff-cutting disciplines resulting from the agreement.  
 
The size of the cut for the Republic of Korea is particularly striking, especially given that 
Korea can avail itself of special and differential treatment, and make cuts that are smaller 
than those in the developed countries. However, the cut required in China’s average tariff 
on agricultural products is quite small, at 2.3 percentage points. This reflects the 
relatively low level of China’s agricultural tariffs; the fact that China can use the smaller  
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cuts required of developing countries; and the fact that some tariff-rate-quotas were not 
filled in the benchmark year for the first MAcMAP database (2001) that underlies the 
GTAP 6 database. Another feature of Table 6 is the fact that the cuts in average applied 
agricultural tariffs are quite small for most countries and regions other than Korea, Japan 
and the European Union. 
 
When introducing sensitive products into Scenario B, it was assumed, following Jean, 
Laborde and Martin (2006), that policy makers would choose to treat as sensitive those 
products for which bound tariffs are high, the gap between bound and applied rates is 
small, and which are important in the sense of having a large value of imports at world 
prices. Jean, Laborde and Martin (2006) examine an alternative approach under which 
policy makers seek to maximize a political-economy support function inspired by 
Grossman and Helpman (1994). This weights more heavily the extent of deviations from 
the policy-makers unconstrained choice of policy instrument, but also leads to large 
reductions in the effective disciplines on tariffs.  
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Cut with Tiered Formula  Scenario B 
  %  % Point Cut  % Point Cut 
China 31.6  14.8  3.4 
Japan 10.4  2.7 1.0 
Korea 17.0  5.0 1.6 
India 10.0  2.6  0.6 
USA 19.8  7.9  1.5 
Mercosur 14.6  5.3  1.3 
ASEAN 19.3  3.9  0.7 
SACU 17.4  5.6  0.9 
EU 15.8  4.2  0.8 
Industrial 16.4  5.8  1.1 
Developing 15.3  5.2  1.1 
LDCs 11.8  1.5 0.3 
WORLD 15.8  5.5  1.1 
 
The results presented in Table 7 highlight the vulnerability of the market-access gains 
from a tiered formula approach to the inclusion of even a small percentage of “sensitive” 
products. China’s potential market access gains are particularly susceptible to erosion 
from this source. With an unadulterated tiered-formula, China would have experienced a 
cut of 14.8 percentage points in the weighted-average agricultural tariff it faces. With just 
two percent of sensitive products in the developed countries, and a total of four percent of 
tariff lines covered by sensitive or “special” categories in developing countries, the cut in 
the tariff facing China falls to only 3.4 percent. The reduction, by approximately a factor 
of five, in the size of the cuts is consistent with the overall average pattern. What is 
striking in China’s case is the very large percentage point reduction of the cut in the 
agricultural tariffs facing China.  
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The welfare implications of the four “Doha” type simulations are presented in Table 8. 
The first four columns of the table present the welfare results in US$billion per year, 
while the remaining four columns present the same results as a share of GDP.  
 
A key finding of the results presented in Table 8 is that China would suffer small losses 
with a Doha-type outcome that included only agriculture. While the global gains from 
such a negotiating outcome would be substantial at $74.5 billion per year, most of these 
gains are concentrated in the industrial countries. This is partly because many of the 
industrial countries have high and variable tariffs in agriculture whose abolition gives 
them substantial welfare gains. It is also partly a consequence of the greater gap between 
bound and applied rates in developing countries—which reduces the impact of formula 
cuts in bound rates on applied rates in developing countries. Finally, it reflects the smaller 
cuts required of developing countries under special and differential provisions.  
Table 8. Welfare Implications of Liberalization under Doha Scenarios 
Country/region  Scen. A  Scen. B  Scen. C  Scen. D  Scen. A  Scen. B  Scen. C  Scen. D 
  $bn  $bn  $bn  $bn  % % % % 
Australia and New Zealand  2.0  1.1  2.4  2.8  0.35  0.20  0.42  0.48 
EU 25 and EFTA  29.5  10.7  31.4  35.7  0.29  0.11  0.31  0.36 
United States  3.0  2.3  4.9  6.6  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.05 
Canada  1.4  0.5  0.9  1.0  0.15  0.05  0.10  0.11 
Japan  18.9  1.8  23.7  25.4  0.38  0.04  0.48  0.51 
Korea, Rep. of, &  Taiwan (China)  10.9  1.7  15.0  22.6  0.86  0.13  1.19  1.79 
Hong Kong (China) and Singapore  -0.1  -0.1  1.5  2.2  -0.02  -0.03  0.35  0.52 
Argentina  1.3  1.0 1.3  1.6  0.32 0.26 0.34 0.39 
Bangladesh  0.0 0.0 -0.1  -0.1  -0.06 -0.03 -0.10 -0.09 
Brazil  3.3  1.1 3.6  3.9  0.50 0.16 0.55 0.59 
China  -0.5  -1.5 1.7  1.6  -0.02 -0.06 0.07 0.06 
India  0.2  0.2 2.2  3.5  0.02 0.03 0.25 0.40 
Indonesia  0.1  0.2 1.0  1.2  0.05 0.07 0.37 0.44 
Thailand  0.9  0.6 2.0  2.7  0.43 0.29 0.99 1.33 
Russian  Federation  -0.3  -0.7 0.8  1.5  -0.06 -0.16 0.16 0.31 
Mexico  -0.2  -0.3 -0.9  -0.2  -0.02 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 
South  Africa  0.1  0.3 0.4  0.7  0.06 0.17 0.25 0.49 
Turkey  0.6  0.0 0.7  1.4  0.25 0.02 0.26 0.55 
High-income  countries  65.6  18.1  79.9 96.4 0.20 0.06 0.25 0.30 
Developing  countries  (WTO  Defn)  19.7  1.2  32.6 47.7 0.17 0.01 0.27 0.40 
Developing  countries  9.0  -0.4  16.1 22.9 0.09 0.00 0.16 0.22 
   East Asia and the Pacific  0.5  -0.8  4.5  5.5  0.01  -0.02  0.13  0.16 
      South  Asia  0.4  0.3 2.5  4.2  0.03 0.03 0.21 0.36 
   Europe and Central Asia  0.1  -0.9  0.8  2.1  0.01  -0.09  0.08  0.21 
   Middle East and North Africa  -0.8  -1.2  -0.6  0.1  -0.07  -0.10  -0.05  0.01 
   Sub-Saharan Africa  0.3  0.0  0.4  1.2  0.06  -0.01  0.10  0.27 
   Latin America and the Caribbean  8.1  2.3  7.9  9.2  0.29  0.08  0.29  0.33 
World  total  74.5  17.7  96.1  119.3  0.18 0.04 0.23 0.28 
 While Table 4 made clear that China could potentially gain from liberalization of 
agricultural trade, the results presented in Table 8 suggest that China would suffer small 
losses from the type of agricultural trade liberalization currently being considered under 
the Doha agenda. One contributing factor to this outcome is the special and differential 
principle of smaller cuts in self-selected developing countries. This means that 
developing countries—and particularly the Republic of Korea, which imposes by far the 
largest tariffs (by value and rate) on China’s agricultural exports—reduce the barriers 
they impose on China’s agricultural exports by a smaller amount than it otherwise would. 
It also means that China cuts its own tariff bindings by smaller amounts than developed 
countries with the same tariffs—and hence China benefits less from reductions in the 
costs imposed by its own protection. Finally, the tops-down nature of the reform is a 
mixed blessing in a multilateral reform context. While the reduction in the variance of 
tariffs associated with a tops-down reform increases efficiency at home, it reduces the 
gain in market access (Anderson and Neary 2006).
3 This last point is explored in 
Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006), who find that a proportional cut that 
brings about the same reduction in average tariff bindings as the tiered formula reduces 
the loss to China from agricultural reform from $0.5 billion to $0.4 billion per year.  
 
Interpretation of the Results 
 
The model-based results presented in this section need careful consideration before they 
are used as a basis for policy. While the modeling approach used in this paper has solid 
                                                 
3 Part of the intuition behind this result is that high-tariff goods have, ceteris paribus, smaller 
amounts of trade than low-tariff goods.  
 2 
theoretical underpinnings, our confidence in key parameter estimates is, unfortunately, 
much weaker. Further, there are known weaknesses in the methodology. One of the 
weaknesses of the methodology used is its level of aggregation. While we have 
information on tariffs at the six-digit level (approx 5100 tariffs), this information is 
aggregated using theoretically-questionable trade-value weights up to 25 sectors for use 
in the model. Manole and Martin (2005) found that aggregation up to a single sector 
reduced the estimated cost of protection by a factor of 15 on average. While our 
aggregation to 25 sectors is much better than aggregating to a single sector, aggregation 
to only 25 sectors will almost certainly result in considerable underestimation of the 
potential gains.  
 
There is a number of other conceptual issues that need to be addressed before one can 
conclude that trade has lost its power to promote economic growth and development. One 
factor that has received a great deal of attention in recent years is the tendency for 
rapidly-growing economies like China’s to expand the range of products they export—
the so-called extensive margin of trade growth (Hummels and Klenow 2006). This 
enables countries to avoid the downward-sloping demand for exports that otherwise 
choke off China’s export expansion. The dramatic growth in China’s exports of 
electronic products in China’s exports since the signing of the Information Technology 
Agreement is further evidence that such linkages can have important effects on growth 
and transformation.  
  
 3 
The dynamic process of trade expansion associated with economic growth and trade 
liberalization has been given a new interpretation by Melitz (2003). Melitz argues that 
liberalization stimulates entry of the more efficient firms into exporting, and that the 
resulting reallocation of resources provides a stimulus to productivity that is additional to 
Arrow’s learning by doing through exporting. While Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) 
and Bernard and Jensen (1995) have questioned the existence of learning-by-doing 
externalities, a number of recent researchers have concluded that there is still evidence of 
productivity growth from this source (see Francois and Martin 2006).  
 
Finally, there is an important value associated with participating in the process. One of 
China’s key strategic goals in joining the WTO was to provide a neutral forum for the 
resolution of the trade disputes that are inevitable given the rapidity of China’s expansion 
as a trading power. Unless the core function of the WTO—the negotiation of successive 
trade agreements—continues, the value of the WTO as a forum for dispute settlement, 
also will decline. This gives China a systemic interest, as well as an interest arising from 




In this paper, we have shown that China undertook a substantial liberalization of its 
merchandise trade in the course of its accession to the WTO. These reforms generated 
substantial welfare gains during the reform process. However, almost axiomatically,  
 4 
these gains mean that the welfare benefits from further reforms are much smaller than 
they would have been without those recent unilateral reforms.  
 
Complete abolition of trade barriers was found to generate global welfare gains of $287 
billion per year. Under this scenario, the benefits to China were estimated at US $5.6 
billion, a gain that would have two and a half times as large even had they not been 
reduced by a substantial deterioration the terms of trade. Roughly three quarters of the 
potential gains to China were found to come from liberalization of non-agricultural 
market access, with only one-quarter from agriculture. Partial reform of the sort being 
negotiated in the Doha round generates smaller benefit estimates, particularly for China. 
The agricultural reform scenarios alone generate small losses. However, the overall 
package including non-agricultural market access generates modest gains. In conclusion, 
we discuss why these simple welfare numbers may not provide a sufficient basis for 
policy formulation, and why better aggregation of protection data, and the introduction of 
new concepts such as ‘extensive margin’ growth will generate much bigger gains for 
China. In other words, the welfare results presented above should be interpreted very 
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